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4Foreword
The incidence and effects of financial exclusion have been well
researched. A surprising number of people are known to be
without access to financial services and experience all the
associated disadvantages.
Overcoming social and financial exclusion is high on the present Government’s agenda. We at
LloydsTSB share this objective and support the Government in ‘looking for a new commitment from
all involved to achieve a step-change in the three priority areas of access to banking, access to
affordable credit and access to money advice’ . 
This is a timely report setting out the background and goals of the Community Banking
Partnership. 
This emphasises the benefits of the partnership approach to achieve the ‘joining up’ necessary to
tackle financial exclusion in robust ways that can be replicated and scaled up nationally.
At the moment, there are pilot projects rather than widely operating partnerships. Experience to
date suggests that partnerships between Credit Unions, Community Development Finance
Institutions, advice and support agencies and financial institutions can play an important part in
promoting financial inclusion. I commend this report to all organisations with a stake in the
community finance sector and encourage them to move their initiatives forward, so that larger
numbers of people can be assisted.
John Spence 
Lloyds TSB
August 2005
Promoting Financial Inclusion December 2004 HM Treasury
1 Promoting Financial Inclusion December 2004 HM Treasury
Over one in four households has little
connection to mainstream financial
services. These households are also
the poorest in the country and pay
disproportionately high costs to settle
a bill, cash a cheque or borrow a
small sum to meet everyday needs.
To address these issues, the
Government has established a
Financial Inclusion Task Force and a
Financial Inclusion Fund. 
The goal is to encourage partnerships that can practically
deliver services in the areas of the country with the highest
levels of financial exclusion. The Government’s policy can
be summarised as: 
n Advice – solving money and debt problems at no cost
to the household
n Banking services – increasing the take up of basic bank
accounts and other similar services like those a credit
union could provide
n Credit – providing affordable loans
This report endorses these but also adds ‘D’ for deposit
making. Deposit making, or savings, is important because
it creates a ladder to financial inclusion and over time can
prevent households and individuals becoming re-excluded.
After reviewing existing financial inclusion initiatives, the
report proposes an innovative Community Banking
Partnership (CBP) approach with the flexibility and
regulatory rigour necessary to bring together through joint
venture arrangements: the specialist expertise of a credit
union, community development finance institution (CDFI)
and advice and support agencies. Our Community Banking
Partnership is not a rigid model, rather, it is five aims based
on a philosophy of a ‘customer first’ approach:
1 Access through a service-level agreement(s) to
appropriate money and debt advice and support;
involving financial literacy training and help with
household budgets and paying bills. 
2 Accessible affordable credit, based on the assumptions
that the competition is doorstep lenders, and that the
sustainability of the community finance lender is of
paramount importance.
3 Access to mainstream banking services, with basic
banking accounts being the start not the end of
financial inclusion.
4 Access to a savings vehicle because this is central to
any long-term solution to financial exclusion.
5 Efficient and effective delivery of services through the
provision of integrated access points for both lenders
and advice agencies. 
To achieve these aims it is first necessary for partners and
contracted service providers to accept that:
a) An understanding of who the client groups are and
that their needs are central to any success.
b) Participants need to be willing to consult, mediate,
and negotiate.
c) Partners and service providers need to be willing to
accept their own limitations, and place working to
achieve financial inclusion over and above narrow
sectoral interests. 
d) That doorstep lenders provide a service that many
people find useful, but that the cost of this service
detrimentally effects the local economy.
e) Resources will be required for advice support and
also long-term technical assistance that cannot be
offset by income from interest rates alone.
f) Credit unions and CDFIs are financial institutions,
not social services. Therefore, they need to adopt a
business model that is operationally sustainable and
not unduly dependent upon long-term grant
funding.
g) There is a need for benchmarks, common reporting
standards, and public disclosure of information.
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Executive Summary
6The report envisages that each CBP would be unique to its locality to reflect the
nature of the existing suppliers and relationships. Broadly there are four levels of
engagement in a CBP. 
Features – direct benefits to customers in bold
Seamless ABCD from a single office – Very close working
relationship between a CDFI and a credit union within a group
organisational structure with a shared chief officer.
Single office, multiple suppliers but almost integrated
services – Partners remain sovereign but work in tandem to an agreed
strategy for the whole community backed up by service level agreements.
Many of the staff could work for one or more partners, and a joint
charity may be established to finance the support and advice activity. No
plans for any overlapping boards or mergers, though some individuals
may sit on more than one organisation’s board.
Single telephone number, access to diaries to make
appointments – This seeks to identify and develop some economies of
scale and improve the customer experience. A working protocol would
not include any reference to the merger of back office provision and/or
enhancing staff understanding by working in the same location. 
Refer to others and can describe what other services are available – 
In areas where existing relationships are not particularly effective and
considerable time needs to be spent on building trust, then a
memorandum of understanding between sovereign organisations may be
the most appropriate solution. There is only limited commitment to
seeking economies of scale.
Approach
Group structure
Service Level
Agreement
Working Protocol
Referral
7These levels of engagement offer an evolutionary way to
deliver an enhanced customer experience and fulfil the
Government’s ambition of a fully inclusive society. The most
important feature is the nature of the contracts between the
parties and specifically the adopted performance targets. If
the community banking partnerships are to grow and
deepen, it is necessary from the outset that all parties
understand what each are to deliver.
The report describes the progress to date – A partnership
of nef (the new economics foundation), the National
Association of Credit Union Workers (NACUW) and
Community Finance Solutions at the University of Salford
have completed feasibility studies in Mid-Wales,
Portsmouth and Southampton, and are undertaking further
studies in Devon, East London, Coventry, North East
England, and Merseyside. By winter 2005/6, a national
pilot demonstration project should be underway involving
initially up to eight CBP pathfinders and with a growing
level of investment support from charitable foundations,
banks and government bodies. 
The goal the National CBP Demonstration Project sets itself
is to demonstrate how to tackle financial exclusion and
provide affordable financial services to low-income
households in a sustainable manner. The five main
objectives are to: 
1 Develop robust delivery prototypes. 
2 Develop a set of common core services that can be
used anywhere in the country.
3 Build strong local Community Banking Partnerships to
assist in marketing the financial inclusion services.
4 Support the progressive transition of the Community
Banking Partnership pathfinders to sustainable sources
of financing and long-term, operational sustainability. 
5 Build upon the best practices that evolve both from the
CBP pathfinders and other similar innovators in this. 
Over a three-year period the National Demonstration
Project will have three main areas of activity:
a) Strengthen the organisational capacity of delivery
partners to provide services on a larger scale and to
achieve operational sustainability through capacity
building, technical support and product
development. 
b) Mobilise local, regional and national resources to
support the pathfinder organisations. 
c) Refine and adapt the delivery mechanism based on
an experiential learning approach appraisal. This
includes the reflections of the partners, together
with the economic performance and social impact of
the Pathfinders. 
The report concludes that if implemented, the CBP will
lead to stronger community-based credit union and CDFI
growth in England and Wales. This will increase access to
affordable financial services by poorer households and
provide a robust methodology for minimising the social
injustices linked with financial exclusion. Conservative
projections show an aggregate direct and measurable
financial benefit to low-income households within five
years of almost £700,000 in each Community Banking
Partnership area. This additional income will not only
directly increase disposable income of Britain’s poorest
households; it also means that there is more cash to spend
in local shops and businesses. Tackling financial exclusion in
this way is socially desirable, but equally it’s good for the
British economy. 
8The financially excluded are defined as those households
unable to access conventional, low-cost financial services
that most British consumers take for granted. According to
government findings, almost six million UK households
(over one in four) fall into this category of disadvantage.
Eleven per cent of British households have no current
account and six per cent have no bank or building society
account of any kind (DWP 2004). Twenty eight per cent of
households have no savings to deal with a ‘rainy day’
problem.
In its latest report on this issue, the National Consumer
Council identifies a number of the excess costs, due to
financial exclusion, as follows:
(i) An extra £70 a year to pay utility bills due to a lack
of direct debit facilities with a bank;
(ii) Fees to cash a cheque of at least a £2 service
charge plus 7 per cent commission;
(iii) Doorstep credit company rates for small loans often
in excess of 300 per cent APR (NCC 2004).
The most severely affected are the poorest households,
especially those with uneven expenditure patterns, such as
young families and lone parents. In its Policy Action Team
14 report on reducing financial exclusion, the Treasury
recommended a range of interventions by different
organisations (H.M. Treasury 1999). A number of these
recommendations such as the ‘basic bank account’ and
wider access to household insurance through group
policies from registered social landlords have been put into
place. Other measures like the Child Trust Fund have been
introduced nationally from April 2005. 
However, despite best intentions from government,
financial exclusion still persists, particularly as regards
personal financial services. Over three million households
regularly use high-cost moneylenders and other predatory
finance providers whose loan rates range from 65 per cent
APR for secured pawnbroker loans to over 1500 per cent
APR for the most expensive and legal doorstep lenders
(Palmer and Conaty 2002).
In such an environment it is unsurprising that over-
indebtedness is rising year on year in Britain according to
Citizens Advice casework findings (CAB 2003).
One reason for the persistence of financial exclusion is that
the diverse initiatives to tackle it normally only address one
element of the problem; predominantly these being access
to a bank account, or access to a start-up loan for a
business. There is no initiative yet that joins up the best
innovations in the field to provide an integrated range of
affordable financial services to poor households (Conaty &
Mayo 1997, Brown et al 2003, Paxton & Reagan 2003).
This is despite empirical evidence indicating demand for
integrated provision (Collard and Kempson – Bristol, 2005).
For example, research into financial exclusion and utility
bills found that support for access to savings and loans,
money advice, energy efficiency advice, and bill payment
services, was greater than for bill payment service alone
(Collard 2002). 
Until 2004, the Government adopted a twin-track
approach of supporting credit unions and promoting basic
bank accounts. Although legislative changes have been
introduced to assist credit unions, finance for institutional
development has been less forthcoming. Meanwhile
though the banks have developed and supply ‘basic’
accounts, the option of the Post Office Card Account
(POCA) has proved attractive for over 5 million benefit
claimants and pensioners, suggesting that either the
product, marketing or indeed the providers, of basic bank
accounts are yet to appeal to the targeted market. 
Background
and rationale
9Credit Unions
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Nationally, the majority of credit unions are community-
based credit unions. In most cases because of their small
size and lack of paid staff, they simply do not currently
have the capacity to provide a viable and attractive
alternative to the poor. Thus of the almost 500
community-based credit unions, the Association of British
Credit Unions (ABCUL) has reported that over half are
either not growing at all or are losing members (Brown et
al. 2003).
Furthermore, the vast majority of community-based credit
unions are run entirely by volunteers and as a result can
only open for a few hours per week3. The scale of
challenge is apparent in ABCUL’s estimate that a
community-based credit union needs to build up a lending
portfolio of £1 million to generate a sufficient income level
of about £100,000 per year to ensure long-term
sustainability free of subsidy (Brown et al. 2003). One
solution suggested by Paul Jones of Liverpool John Moore’s
University (1999) is that appropriate mergers can
strategically secure significant growth. Evidence is
emerging that this advice is being heeded with a marked
rise in the number of mergers in recent years, occurring in
tandem with an overall growth in credit union membership
and assets (Jones 2005).
Since the debate on financial exclusion arose, credit unions
have been seen as the solution (Jones 2002). However,
there have been a number of challenges to this orthodoxy
both within the credit union movement and by outsiders.
Internally, Jones (1999 and 2005) and ABCUL have argued
that credit unions cannot fulfil their role unless they
become more professional. This usually entails the need to
appoint paid staff, have shop front offices, and diversify
products and services. There is also an acceptance that
without additional capital, whether in the form of 
seed-corn finance, lending capital, or guarantee funds
(Jones 2003 & 2005); credit unions will not be able to
tackle financial exclusion. 
The transfer to this ‘more professional’ approach (known
by its proponents as New Model credit unions) has not
been without its critics, particularly within the movement.
An ideological division arose over whether credit unions
were community owned and operated organisations and
should therefore grow organically, or whether the best way
to serve a community would be for a credit union to grow
fast and thus with more members be in a stronger position
to offer more extensive services to low income households
(Fuller & Jonas 1999). However, Dayson (2002) found
limited evidence for this neat dichotomy and instead
pointed to the similarities in the arguments employed, even
if the approaches differed.
Beyond the level of current debates, the extent of the role
of credit unions can be questioned on the basis of their
status as mutual organisations, which historically have
been risk averse. In Britain, the most successful financial
mutuals have been the building societies and mutual
assurance companies. Common to both is a desire to
minimise risk to protect investors’ money. This financial
model usually means mutuals grow slower than other
corporate forms but in return investment is expected to be
safer (though this is not always true). To achieve this,
building societies predominantly offer mortgage type
products and supply very few unsecured lending services.
Although in recent years building societies have borrowed
from the money markets for on-lending, city investors see
even this form of capital injection as relatively conservative
(Dayson 2002). Essentially mutuals are custodians of small
investors’ savings and have historically sought to preserve
this income, even in the days before shareholder
protection. Consequently building societies at risk are
usually rescued by other societies, such as that following
the Grays Building Society collapse in 1978. 
A similar desire to protect investors’ income was also
apparent among credit unions, which resulted in strict
lending criteria being applied. Most significantly this led to
the 13-week rule being introduced by many credit unions
(Jones 1999). This lending interpretation meant that all
new members had to save for 13 weeks before they could
take out a loan. 
Types of Community Financial Initiatives
Operating Britain
2 A credit union is a mutual savings and loan scheme in which the
‘members’ are drawn from a legally defined area/community called a
‘common bond’.
3 At present only about one in five community-based credit
unions employ any paid staff and usually only a part time
person.
Another risk minimisation strategy was to limit loans to a
specific multiplier of savings (often twice times savings for
first loan and thereafter three times savings), while a
member could not access existing savings whilst they had a
loan. Although these cautious practices were not
regulatory or legal requirements, the convention was
nonetheless extremely pervasive.  As the debate
surrounding financial exclusion crystallised, critics
highlighted the 13 week rule as an indicator of the failure
of credit unions to serve the financially excluded (Dayson et
al. 1999). However, criticism does not fully consider the
implication of credit unions as mutuals, with a
philosophical commitment to provide a safe home for
savings.  
With the extension of the investors’ shareholder protection
scheme to credit unions in 2003, it removed the existing
informal cultural and trust based relationships between
borrowers and lender and replaced this with a
depersonalised mechanism. Though this improved the
security of savings, it potentially alters, though we do not
know in which way, the social contract between credit
unions and their members. Regardless of this, credit unions
are still mutuals and the extension of instant loan products
to new members has been a gradual process (Jones 2003,
2005). Furthermore, credit unions have understandably
wanted to ensure arrears and defaults on loans do not
affect the financial stability of the business. Therefore, if
credit unions are to offer loans to new members
unencumbered by any savings they will have to find ways
to enhance their repayment procedures and/or offset the
risk. Both of these arguments contributed to the shift to
more professional service, understandably, and
enthusiastically, supported by ABCUL.  
Initially the use of guarantee funds was seen as a suitable
mechanism to offset higher risk lending, but as Jones
(2003) demonstrated, this was not always successful,
partially due to moral hazard. An alternative strategy was a
change to the way money was collected by moving from
cash based transfer to repayment by direct debit (a practice
already widespread among employee based credit unions).
Furthermore, the risk could also be afforded if the interest
rate on loans genuinely reflected the likelihood of arrears
and default. This shift has been a difficult challenge for the
credit union movement, as it would require changing the
maximum legal limit of 12.68 percent APR. 
The most common argument against changing the interest
rate is that all members will have to pay more; based on
the philosophical assumption that as all members are equal
they should all pay the same interest rate. Connected to
this are the arguments that there is no evidence that the
financially excluded are bad payers; and why should those
most at risk pay more? In effect the latter is a
manifestation of the former, as to date we are unaware of
any independent British evidence indicating that lending to
the financially excluded is more risky than lending to more
included communities, rather the costs of delivery are
higher. Instead this ‘empirical argument’ supports a social
justice and redistributive moral philosophy. The difficulty
for credit unions is that as cooperative and moral
businesses they could find themselves torn between the
competing pressure of economic prudence and the delivery
of social benefit. The current Treasury consultation on the
relaxation on interest rates (H.M. Treasury 2005) is where
this tension will need to be resolved. Raising the ceiling at
least allows for wider flexibility to be practiced and
provides more scope to balance the different social and
economic objectives. 
However, credit union supporters would argue that
offering flexible loan packages is only half of the financial
inclusion services they provide. Most stress the importance
of savings, believing that only through this can genuine
financial inclusion be realised. Affordable loans should
increase disposable income, but unless the individual
begins to save for unexpected expenses rather than take
new loans, they will always be at risk of falling back into
financial exclusion. The challenge for credit unions is to
encourage savings, while not ‘punishing’ those who chose
an alternative way to manage their finances. 
In summary, credit unions have been involved in huge
shifts in thinking and approach as they respond to the
sector’s growth patterns and the Government’s agenda on
financial inclusion. However, it is impossible to argue, as it 
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was in 1999, that credit unions are still unable to serve
poorer neighbourhoods. Whether all credit unions chose
this path and how comfortable the journey will be, remain
open questions.
Cambridge New Horizons Savings and
Loan Scheme (NHSLS)
The forerunner to non-credit union approaches to financial
exclusion was created in Cambridge in 1997. NHSLS was
and continues to be a joint venture between Cambridge
Housing Society (CHS) and Cambridge Building Society
(CBS) aimed at providing affordable credit and competitive
savings rates to CHS tenants. NHSLS is not a legally
incorporated body rather it acted as an additional function
of CHS, with the loan management undertaken by CBS.
The scheme operated with CHS placing £25,000 on
deposit with CBS. Tenants were then encouraged to save
with the building society and the interest rate they received
was as if they had invested £25,000 themselves.
Meanwhile, they are able to access loans on a similar basis
to credit unions, being charged at 12.68 percent APR.
Additionally, NHSLS has offered small immediate ‘handy
loans’ of up to £150 for household emergencies. Part of
the justification for the project was the perceived difficulty
in establishing a viable credit union in Cambridge; this is
partially borne out by the modest number of loans made
since its inception. However, the significance of NHSLS was
its partnership-based approach, and the involvement of a
mainstream financial provider and a housing association in
addressing financial exclusion. This approach has been
further developed by Community Reinvestment Trusts. 
Community Reinvestment Trusts
The changes in credit unions have happened alongside the
introduction of what some within the credit union industry
see as competitors, Community Reinvestment Trusts
(CRTs)4. Whether credit union changes are in response to
the arrival of a perceived ‘threat’ or whether it is purely
coincidence is not the purpose of this paper. What can be
asserted with confidence is that CRTs offered a different
way of addressing financial exclusion. 
CRTs emerged from University of Salford  (Dayson et al
1999) and were a response to the dominance of doorstep
lenders within deprived communities. They were based on
the premise that, with the withdrawal of formal banking
services from many communities, the only way to compete
against moneylenders was to offer a similar service but at
an affordable cost. Furthermore, it was unrealistic to expect
the capital for this process to come from within the very
communities that needed the help. Instead a model was
proposed, based on Industrial and Provident Society (IPS)
legislation and the groundbreaking work of the Aston
Reinvestment Trust (ART) and the Industrial and Common
Ownership Fund (ICOF), that sought capital from public
(UK and European regeneration funds) and private sources
(charitable trusts, banks, and housing associations). An IPS
for ‘community benefit’ can also raise a small amount of
capital in withdrawable shares from local people, local
businesses, and individual ethical investors.
By mid-2005, eight CRT projects were trading (South Coast
Money Line, Salford Money Line, East Lancashire
Moneyline, Derbyloans, Sandwell Advice and Moneylink,
Preston Moneyline, Blackpool Moneyline, and Fair Finance
in London). collectively to date, they have lent over £5
million to individuals and business through a range of
products – personal loans, business start-up loans,
consolidation loans, and home improvement loans. 
The key operational features of a CRT are:
(i) Investment is distributed in the form of loans issued on
the ability of local people to repay;
(ii) Loans can be for either personal or business enterprise
use and repayments schedules are agreed between the
client and the lender;
(iii) Except in limited circumstances, loans are collected by
direct debit;
(iv) The lending team is not based on volunteers but paid
professional staff;
(v) The IPS is mutually owned by shareholders who
annually elect the directors on a one-member, one-vote
system;
(vi) The loan charges are set at a cost recovery rate, which
reflects both the risk involved and the cost of running
the business; 
(vii) As a not-for-profit institution, the loan charges are not
set to achieve a surplus to enable a targeted dividend
to shareholders. 
11
4 CRTs were subsequently classified as a type of Community Development
Finance Institution (CDFI) that delivered personal as well as enterprise lending.
By contrast, most CDFIs mainly lend to enterprises and for economic
production. However, in response to the Treasury’s financial inclusion strategy,
this dichotomy is likely to dissolve as some CDFIs are considering extending
their products to include individual consumption loans.
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In respect to (vi), a number of interest rates were tested by
the first few CRTs and at present they offer rates between
22-30 per cent APR for consumer and business/enterprise
loans. 
The most striking success has been East Lancashire
Moneyline (elm). In its first two years of operation elm
made 1,800 loans and assisted over 2,000 financially
excluded customers. Among elm users, 95 per cent were
indebted to sub-prime lenders when help was sought, 89
per cent had no savings, and 40 per cent had no bank
account. A typical recent case was a young unemployed
woman who borrowed £250 from a moneylender at more
than 150 per cent to decorate and pay for basic furnishing
for her flat. The company made her a further loan at
Christmas and then she needed £500 to tide her over to
start work until she got her paycheck. elm lent her £1,000
to refinance all three loans and rescued the woman from a
downward spiral of insolvency.
Despite the attractions of this model, for some the absence
of a savings facility has cast doubt on the capacity of CRTs
to truly serve the financially excluded. Whereas such a CDFI
can be seen as an immediate solution to affordable credit,
both for the borrower and policymakers, it is unlikely to
result in full inclusion. Thus, in being an alternative to
moneylenders with a team of professional lending staff, it
can be argued that CRTs perpetuate the same asymmetrical
knowledge/power axis. Also critics state that CRTs do not
seek to educate clients or offer services that will improve a
user’s situation over a period of time. Essentially this is a
philosophical divide. Credit unions with their reliance on
savings and the discipline of saving before borrowing
provide a ‘pathway’ to improved financial health, based on
asset accumulation and education, drawing heavily on the
concept of thrift and self-help. In contrast CRT developers
have been sceptical about the applicability of this model to
the poor and raise the question: if users are unable or
unwilling to develop a savings habit are they to be denied
financial inclusion? 
Furthermore, with the mass expansion of consumer
lending is there a class hypocrisy lurking in the pro-savings
argument: while the financially included middle class are
encouraged to borrow billions, the working class are
instructed to save in order to be included. 
These philosophical arguments are rarely, if ever, discussed
by practitioners, and CRTs have addressed the perceived
weaknesses by making linkages with other agencies,
specifically the high street banks. This connection benefits
the CRT user by offering a causeway to the mainstream
sector, which can then be accessed for conventional
savings products. It also ensures the user has a bank
account, meaning that the CRT can collect loan
repayments by direct debit. As a result, the user learns how
to use a bank account and is expected to ensure there is
sufficient income in their account to cover direct debit
repayments. East Lancs Moneyline has gone further still by
acting as an agent for the HBOS and thus is able to offer a
mainstream bank savings account to elm’s clients. CRTs
believe that this arrangement offers genuine financial
inclusion for users and avoids financial ghettoisation in a
low-cost alternative. This contrasts with some credit unions
that are seeking to offer a range conventional banking
services; perceiving themselves as mainstream providers. 
Although important to the protagonists, the debate can
never be resolved on the basis of philosophical preferences.
Financial Inclusion Newcastle and Financial Inclusion
Services Yorkshire have both sought to bypass the
arguments and develop less ideological and judgemental
perspectives. 
Financial Inclusion Newcastle
Alongside CRTs, another customer focused approach to
financial inclusion has emerged in Newcastle. Research by
Northumbria University identified high cost credit and
consumer debt as significant issues in the West End area of
the city. Subsequently this led to a broad coalition of
groups coming together and a participatory appraisal
approach being taken to ascertain the views of residents.
Participants in this research argued that existing
mainstream provision was either insufficiently available
(due to closure of bank branches or inappropriate opening
hours) or ‘intimidating’ (Fuller & Mellor 2004:10). By
contrast, doorstep lenders were often seen as inclusionary,
while credit unions and the post office were also viewed
positively. Respondents wanted a service that was
‘physically accessible, safe and secure, pleasant to be in
and welcoming for all’ (Fuller & Mellor 2004:11), with staff
drawn from the locality. Services requested by local
residents included savings and loans products, cash points,
money advice, financial education, basic bank accounts,
and insurance services. (Fuller & Mellor 2004) 
In responding to these preferences, the development plan
in Newcastle began from the premise that financial
exclusion was as much a social as a financial matter. As a
result, the potential role of credit unions was recognised. In
addition, Lloyds TSB agreed to join the coalition as the
banking partner. The partnership became known as
Financial Inclusion Newcastle (FIN), and secured public
funding to establish three credit union offices. Volunteers
and support workers staffed the offices, while the credit
unions were connected through a joint IT system and
server. This approach differed from that proposed by Jones
(1999) as it enabled small credit unions to remain
independent rather than necessarily seeking growth
through merger. However, more innovatively, the services
also incorporated money and debt advice operated by the
CAB, financial education, micro-enterprise advice, and a
loan package for high-risk applicants backed by a
guarantee fund. The entire range of extramural credit
union activities were contracted through Financial Inclusion
Newcastle Limited (a joint venture enterprise formed as a
company limited by guarantee). 
In the two years since its inception, the credit union
members of FIN have seen membership grow by 198 per
cent (comparing growth 2002-04 to 2000-02), the number
of loans by 43 per cent, and total funds lent by 56 per
cent. In addition the FIN loan guarantee scheme has
granted 29 loans worth £10,500 with a default rate less
than 20 per cent. FIN loans have assisted with bridging
loans between jobs, furniture for young people leaving
home, rent deposits, clothes for a new job, household
repairs, white goods and maternity costs. (Fuller & Mellor
2004)
As FIN progresses, the partnership will need to secure
greater funding for the credit unions, as at present the non
credit unions have received greater support. If not
addressed, this imbalance may cause tensions within the
partnership. In their evaluation Fuller and Mellor (2004)
also highlighted: the weaknesses about governance; the
reliance of FIN on the credit unions to deliver services; and
the inability through the terms of the partnership to
challenge under performance of autonomous delivery
agents. They also felt that, FIN’s limited geographical area
may restrict future growth and that the tensions in the
partnership flag the risk of professionals supplanting
community engagement in the direction of the project.
Clearly, FIN’s strength is that, unlike most CRTs, it includes
savings products and has community ownership and
control. However, a loose association between different
agencies means that it is entirely reliant on goodwill for
delivery, while there is a risk that objectives may become
blurred and the project will ultimately follow the views of
its strongest supporter. 
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Financial Inclusion Services Yorkshire
In many respects Financial Inclusion Services Yorkshire
(FISY) structure was created to address the problems
experienced in Newcastle by FIN. Although much of the
activity was very similar to that performed by FIN, the
context was different, which highlights the importance of
designing mechanisms that reflect local circumstances.
Thus the scale of the operation was much larger (city-wide
coverage initially and an extension of service across South
Yorkshire thereafter), while the relationship with local
credit unions was stronger. Like FIN, the originators of FISY
wanted to place credit unions at the forefront of any
solution; however, they also sought to establish a separate
CRT (Yorkshire Moneyline) that would specialise in the
higher risk lending. An outcome of this strategy was that
Sheffield moved towards a citywide ‘live and work’ credit
union through the voluntary merger of three small
community based credit unions (some still remain outside
of the merged credit union). 
To avoid any disputes between the credit union and the
CRT, FISY was established as the over-arching company
with a single chief executive charged to pursue and ensure
service delivery on the citywide strategy. FISY was also
responsible for promotion, money management advice and
financial literacy. To fulfil legal requirements, three
organisations were established, and brought together to
operate under the same management and from the same
premises in Sheffield city centre. Another innovation is that
all loan repayments for Yorkshire Moneyline are collected
through the credit unions and until the end of the 2004
most transactions were made in cash. 
In the first six months of trading since October 2004,
Yorkshire Moneyline made 105 loans totalling £34,000 and
Sheffield Credit Union has gained 244 new members (105
of those were introduced via Yorkshire Moneyline) and 97
new junior members. 
Although it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the
Sheffield model, it does offer a stronger structure than that
operated in Newcastle and possibly as a result, FISY has
overcome the limitations that both credit unions and CRTs
face when working in isolation. By comparison to FIN, less
prominent in FISY is the priority given to money and debt
advice. Also by comparison to CRTs, its reliance on cash
repayments to date may limit both its growth and its ability
to reduce operating costs. 
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Credit unions have clearly changed in recent years, with a
stronger emphasis on professionalism and the gradual
development of more innovative loan products. Ultimately
these shifts should benefit lower income households, and
credit unions as independent financial institutions. Though
in one regard the mutual nature of credit unions will
invariably make it difficult to serve those considered most
excluded or higher risk clients, the capacity to take savings,
and encourage a ‘savings culture’ offers a long-term
approach to lifting people out of financial exclusion.
Although CRTs are nominally mutual organisations they
differ from credit unions in two aspects:
1 They are ‘community benefit’ not ‘cooperatively
owned’ organisations.
2 Their lending capital is not drawn from members’
savings. 
This enables CRTs to develop services aimed at the
financialy excluded without risking the savings of small
investors. These differences come at a price because CRTs
cannot offer savings facilities. The inability to mobilise
savings is a major constraint to their development – both
because savings services are a vital financial service, which
help people manage risk, accumulate assets and overcome
indebtedness, and because savings can provide an
important low-cost, capital base for achieving
organisational growth and sustainability. 
On the other hand, unlike credit unions, CRT loan charges
are not restricted by law to a maximum of 12.68 percent
APR. Thus they can and do charge somewhat higher
interest rates for riskier, short-term, micro-credit loans.
These loans may be in the region of 18 to 30 per cent APR
but are still highly affordable compared to credit packages
from high-cost lenders. As loan volume builds, the extra
income from these higher-price loans enables CRTs to
provide, on a sustainable basis, micro-credit finance for
new start businesses/enterprises and other higher risk
consumer lending. In this way, CRTs can earn enough
interest income to cover operating costs, loan delinquency
costs, and losses from write offs – something, which credit
unions with their current statutory interest cap cannot
feasibly do5. 
It is our view that both CRTs and credit unions can have a
crucial role in addressing financial exclusion but this will
only happen if they are prepared to work together. This
new approach builds on the experiences in Cambridge,
Newcastle, and particularly Sheffield. New Horizons
demonstrated how building societies and housing
associations could become partners, FIN showed how it
was possible to retain small community credit unions while
enhancing financial inclusion, while FISY attempted to
bring a credit union and a CRT in close alliance6. Moreover
both models place money advice at the heart of their
approaches. Clearly, much local activity is already being
delivered; the next stage is to connect this learning with
the lessons from international experience to establish a
replicable and effective community banking partnership.
Summary of UK Experience
5 Under a local partnership with a credit union, a CRT could specifically provide
the riskier and higher cost loans to new customers. If these loans prove to be
good loans, thereafter the credit union partner on the strength of this ‘credit
track record’ could offer through the partnership lower cost loans to the same
household.
6 A similar partnership is also being delivered at Blackpool Moneyline, and
Sandwell Advice and Moneylink.
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Research in 2003 by nef (the new economics foundation),
the National Consumer Council and the National
Association of Credit Union Workers (NACUW) has pointed
to the potential for extending a Community Development
Finance Institution approach in Britain to assist in upscaling
community-based credit union growth (Brown et al 2003).
This study drew on good practice in England and Wales
among community-based credit unions and also the
impressive success achieved through a strategic investment
approach to credit union growth as demonstrated by the
Community Development Finance Institution Fund in the
USA, during the past decade.7 In particular in respect of
credit union support, the CDFI Fund has invested in over
one hundred Community Development Credit Unions
(CDCUs) in low-income urban and rural areas. Over half
the American CDCUs have benefited from investment
packages from the CDFI Fund. The average size of each
CDCU investment award has been in the region of
$250,000. 
CDCUs are a special type of credit union that primarily
have a social mission to tackle financial exclusion.
Numerically they represent only a small fraction of the
10,000 plus credit unions in the USA. Notwithstanding
this, in 2002, the 210 members of the National Federation
of Community Development Credit Unions (NFCDCU
2003):
n Mobilized savings in low - income communities of
$2.29 billion.
n Loaned $1.04 billion to their low - and 
moderate - income member borrowers.
n Saved some $300 million in interest otherwise payable
to predatory lenders.
n Recycled over $34 million in dividends to low - and
moderate - income members.
Learning from International Experience
7 Clinton approved the Community Development Financial Institutions Act in
September 1994. This law set up the American CDFI Fund to invest strategically
in the development of all CDFIs (including CDCUs).
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The ‘Credit Path’ and money advice
Banks find it difficult to assist low-income households
because of the high transaction costs associated with
unbanked ‘cash managers’. These costs are typically 10-20
times higher than for conventional customers who operate
their accounts electronically. Credit unions also experience
the same transaction cost problems. Brown et al. (2003)
identified innovative practices developed by credit unions
and money advice agencies in Ireland and by Community
Development Credit Unions in the USA to tackle this
transaction cost problem. In Ireland, the Money Advice and
Budgeting Service (MABS), supported by the Irish
Government, has developed a ‘local partnership model’ to
deliver to low-income households the core services the UK
Government would like to see. These include: savings, free
money advice, bill and debt repayment and affordable
credit. Over the past 10 years, MABS has become a
recognized national service. The local partners include local
authorities, national utilities, financial institutions,
charitable bodies, community advice services and other
creditor bodies.
In the USA, Community Development Credit Unions
(CDCUs), with the assistance of the US Government, have
considerably widened access to affordable credit with a
creative approach called the Credit Path. This identifies four
stages to achieving financial inclusion among the poorest
households:
Stage 1: Transactor services to help households budget
and pay bills.
Stage 2: Saver services to help households save in
flexible ways.
Stage 3: Borrower services to extend affordable credit
to ‘high risk’ households.
Stage 4: Ownership services to enable households to
become asset owners for the first time.
The Credit Path approach reveals the weaknesses of
conventional approaches among credit unions that have
not effectively enabled the lowest income households to
join in large numbers. By tackling basic money
management problems, as a priority, and assisting with the
provision of transactor services, CDCUs have shown how
credit unions can intervene to help the poorest households.
To take this intervention further, American CDCUs, with
support from the US Government and banks, have also
developed special lending systems to overcome the
problems faced by low-income households using high-cost
predatory lenders. Such lending in the UK among licensed
moneylenders alone is worth annually £3.5 billion with
lending rates ranging from 160 per cent to 800 per cent
APR (Palmer & Conaty 2002). 
The key lessons from the success of both American CDCUs
and the Irish MABS systems for tackling financial exclusion
are:
(i) Pilot or pathfinder projects should be well
resourced;
(ii) Advice services need to be separately funded from
bill payment and debt repayment operations;
(iii) Affordable micro-credit facilities helps budgeting
and can circumvent moneylenders and predatory
credit providers if products are well designed;
(iv) Social housing organisations can become excellent
partners.
In the USA a small but growing number of CDCUs have
developed group structures that separate out higher risk
lending and specialist lending, often in a sister CDFI
company. Also services requiring ongoing subsidy such as
financial literacy and business advice can be delivered
through a third charitable or non-profit company in the
group. The Community Banking Partnership approach has
taken considerable inspiration from this group company
methodology, as the American CDCUs with this structure
are among the fastest growing and most successful CDCUs
(Rosenthal, 2005).
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The complexity of the services required to effectively serve
the financially excluded is most likely to be achieved if
specialist agencies can work together. Two of the necessary
elements for this are for the delivery agencies to have
sufficient professionalism and be financialy stable. For the
Community Finance Initiatives, whether credit unions or
CDFIs, this will entail ‘scaling up’, 8a situation recognised
by Dayson et al (1999) in the case of CRTs and Jones (1999
and 2005) in the case of credit unions.
Among the largest 20 per cent of community-based credit
unions in England and Wales, there are an identifiable
number of credit unions able and keen to scale up and
deliver financial inclusion services like their counterparts in
the USA and Ireland. Indeed, there are many examples of
innovative community-based credit union practice in the
UK (Brown et al, 2003). Key strategic decisions by these
credit unions to achieve growth are evident. Success
factors include:
(i) Access to longer term investment funding for
staffing and shop fronts.
(ii) Registering common bonds that can expedite a
critical mass of assets and membership for rapid
growth. This may be through merger, but equally
many will have an existing critical mass, others will
have expanded, either geographically and/or
compositionally through federal systems.
(iii) Strong social business leadership from the credit
union board and staff to achieve success. 
An example is Riverside Credit Union in south Liverpool,
which has trebled in size to over 4,400 members in the
past six years and expanded its asset base over the same
period by over 400 per cent by raising member savings
levels from £181,000 to £850,000. Two other good
examples are the Enterprise Credit Union in Knowsley and
the Robert Owen Credit Union in rural Mid-Wales.
Enterprise CU has grown from 500 to almost 4,500
members over the past seven years and increased its assets
in share capital by 2000 per cent since 1998 from a savings
level of £45,000 to just under £1 million. With only two
part time paid members of staff, Robert Owen CU in the
past few years has been growing at a rate of almost 30 
percent annually and has achieved a membership in a very
sparsely populated area of 1,400 and an asset base of
£350,000. 
Like CDCUs, these successful community-based credit
unions have diversified their services sensibly to attract a
broader base of members. Today they each offer a range
of loans, household insurance and ways for their members
to budget and manage money more affordably. Enterprise
Credit Union has been the first credit union in Britain to
offer a MABS service. Robert Owen Credit Union has
developed a successful loan service for the rural 
self-employed. Equally, the CRTs have found that their
affordable instant personal consumption loans have proved
particularly popular. 
Tackling Financial Exclusion –
Scaling Up
8 This doesn’t necessarily mean individual credit unions having to expand, as
it may be possible to ‘scale up’ through a federated structure of smaller
credit unions.
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It is also necessary to understand that tackling financial
exclusion can be expensive; though methods can be
identified to minimise these costs. Research by Community
Finance Solutions, which was funded jointly by Lloyds TSB,
Barclays Bank, and the Housing Corporation, examined the
transaction cost problem faced by CFIs in providing
microcredit to low-income households in Britain. One of
the main findings was that loan processing time is very
high for both CDFIs and credit unions, and that further
economies of scale were possible. The researchers
concluded that there was a need for a more integrated
approach between all the agencies involved in addressing
financial exclusion to assist the poorest households most
efficiently and effectively. 
The need here is two-fold: On the one hand there is the
need for community finance lending services to be scaled
up by sharing back office services thereby economising on
time spent processing loans; on the other hand there is
also a strong need for integrated advice and support
services. A group structure involving a CDFI and charity is
common to the operation of CRTs such as South Coast
Money Line, and Salford Money Line. CFS concluded that
the potential integration of a credit union within such a
group structure or through a close local partnership could
provide a ‘one-stop shop’ solution (Dayson 2004).
Separately and simultaneously, nef and NACUW were
reaching a similar conclusion. 
When discussing the performance of entities with a social
mission, sustainability has both a financial and non-
financial element. With regards to reaching the target
audience, Dayson (2004) found that both credit unions and
CRTs served deprived communities, with the only tangible
difference being that credit union clients tended to be
slightly older, wealthier and more likely to be in a stable
relationship. However, it should be noted that Dayson’s
case study research only examined one credit union and
three CRTs, so it would be inappropriate to apply these
findings universally. Similar caution should be used when
examining the financial sustainability of these
organisations, but regardless of the numbers examined,
credit unions, savings and loans schemes, and CRTs, have
widely different business models, regulatory frameworks,
and stages of development so it is virtually impossible, as
well as inappropriate, to directly compare them. 
Primarily reliant on the surplus from loans for most income,
credit unions must produce a surplus in order to build a
sufficient reserve ratio compliant with FSA regulations and
to pay a dividend that is satisfactory to members. In the
case study, most of the staff costs were met by public
funds, though the credit union was prepared to reduce
staffing if required once the funding ends. Ultimately,
sustainability is dependent on expanding the business and
reducing bad debt. (Jones 2005). By contrast most savings
and loans schemes are not pursuing sustainability, being
part of much larger organisations. Therefore most costs
were not discernable from the respective partner’s standard
activities. By contrast, business plans for the CRTs originally
forecasted that sustainability would occur in five years.
When comparing the performance of the CRTs against
their original budgets, all three organisations surpassed
their year 1 targets. In year 2 (see table below), the two
oldest CRTs missed their goals, while the newer CRT
reached its income target but overshot its expenditure
budget.
As the table shows, the CRTs were struggling to match
their budgets because the average size of the loan was 25
per cent lower than expected, while the staff costs were
62 per cent above estimates. It should be noted that
subsequent to these research findings, one of the CRTs has
declared that it is now 80 per cent sustainable. 
Tackling Financial Exclusion – 
The Sustainability Challenge
Ratios Year 2 Budget Year 2 Actual
Total cost per loan £284 £435
Staff cost per loan £139 £237
Average loan £1044 £784
Bad debt & provision 6.77 9.33
Annual income per loan £112.16 £81.94
Cost Income 2.53 5.3
The research offered four explanations of why CRTs have
not achieved their original budgets (this assumes that the
budgets were realistic):
1 Were they too successful in serving their target
audience? In reaching the financially excluded, CRTs
found that the unstable personal finances of clients
have resulted in erratic repayments and much smaller
loans being requested. 
2 Capped interest rates? The least successful CRT had its
interest rate capped at 15 per cent. This limited
operating income and restricts the capacity of the CRT
to engage in higher risk lending. By contrast the most
successful CRT charged 29 per cent APR with no
apparent detrimental impact on its client base.
3 Difficulty opening new markets? All CRTs were
expected to make home improvement loans linked to
private sector housing renewal. To date these schemes
have not materialised, removing a key source of
relatively stable income that was forecast to come from
such larger loans.
4 Doing the job of others? All the CRTs and the credit
union in the survey believed that one main contributory
reason for missing targets was the need to undertake
advice and support work with clients. This was
unexpected and has taken considerable staff time,
thereby preventing other activity. Staff timesheet
analysis highlighted that on average a fifth of time has
been spent on advice related tasks and that CRTs and
credit unions are frequently engaged in the unpaid
delivery of financial literacy, money advice and support
tasks. 
Based on these findings, in order to improve sustainability,
Dayson (2004) stressed the need for more hands-on
relationships with advice agencies. To be successful, this
may involve advice agencies changing some of their
practices, such as recommending credit unions and CRTs to
users, rather than the current guidance of maintaining
neutrality when discussing lenders. The Treasury implicitly
accepted this argument with the announcement of the
relaxation of the FSA’s financial advice rule for money
advice workers. The experience of FIN and FISY showed
that there was also a need to build more productive
relationships between CRTs and credit unions. Too often
relationships were ambivalent or even hostile, with
personalities and organisational development being
prioritised over social policy objectives. 
Partnerships with banks also need to become more
sophisticated, particularly in the delivery of basic bank
accounts between credit unions, CRTs and local bank
branches. Operationally there is a need for more strategic
investment in integrated IT systems and duplication in
staffing also needed to be examined. Finally, only the credit
union and one CRT demonstrated sufficient community
engagement – thus increased participation and
improvement in governance was required. It was these
collective shortcomings that helped inform the evolution of
our thinking on financial services for the financially
excluded, which ultimately led to the Community Banking
Partnership approach. 
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Over the past eight years the Government has shown a
willingness to test new financial inclusion ideas, before
settling on its policy outlined in the Pre-budget report in
December 2004. The priorities being:
Money and debt Advice
Access to Banking services
Access to affordable Credit
All these are required in any Community Banking
Partnership approach, but we also believe that a D needs
to be added to the ABC of financial inclusion. That is to
‘encourage Deposit making’. To be fulfilled the D has two
elements: recognising the importance of credit union
savings facilities; and developing effective financial literacy
training, to enable users to understand the importance of
savings. Deposit making is important because it creates a
ladder to financial inclusion and over time can prevent
households and individuals become re-excluded. It is also
connects with the Government’s wider agenda on creating
a stakeholder society through policies like the Child Trust
Fund, and the Savings Gateway. By adding ’D’ the financial
inclusion strategy moves beyond addressing current
problems to building a financially included society that
lasts. 
Though deposit making is central to any financial inclusion
policy, the Community Banking Partnership’s crucial
contribution could be in the operationalisation of the
financial inclusion strategy. In effect it provides a joined-up
answer to the question: how to do it?
The cornerstone of our approach is that we should begin
from the assumption that financial inclusion is of itself
desirable, both from economic necessity and on the basis
of citizenship rights.9 From here it is necessary to place the
individual user at the centre of any solution and therefore
accept that users may wish to exercise choice in the ways
they can be financially included. It is also a requisite that if
financial inclusion is a matter of citizenship, then it is
appropriate that the state should ensure barriers to
inclusion are minimised, through funding inclusion projects
and preventing private concerns from causing exclusion. 
However, if the private sector is to engage, the community
finance sector needs to improve its effectiveness. This
means looking for efficiency savings, developing working
protocols, and managing and promoting interrelationships.
It is our opinion that financial inclusion can only be
achieved through a holistic approach. By judicious use of
its funding and astute drafting of terms of conditions on
these contracts, the Government should encourage
existing agencies to coordinate service delivery so that a
consumer focused approach is achieved. This means
learning lessons from the work in Sheffield and Newcastle
and promoting productive partnerships. It means
acknowledging the excellent work performed by existing
advice agencies and community finance initiatives but
insisting that serving the customer requires working
outside of silos. Clearly, the move to relax the rules on
financial advice provided by advice workers for a two-year
period is a welcome step in this direction, but this needs
be the beginning of the process. We need to adopt and
adapt concepts of ‘delivery clusters’ that are prevalent in
hi-tech growth areas, such as Silicon Valley. This does not
necessarily mean organisations losing their identity but that
services are arranged collectively with the single purpose of
maximising the benefit to the customers. Such an
approach, may lead to financial inclusion ‘drop-in centres’,
based on the same principle now being rolled-out across
the NHS. These drop-in centres would not only benefit the
users but they enable different agencies involved in
delivering different aspects of the financial inclusion
strategy to work in close proximity and thus share
knowledge, working practices, and ideas. Just as in the
private sector this should produce a more productive and
faster growing sector. In this way the Government gets
more ‘bang for its buck’. 
Integrating Community Banking
Partnerships into the Financial
Inclusion Strategy
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9 Drawing on Marshall (1980) there are many non-state services that are
needed to enable a citizen to fully participate in modern society. Access to
bank accounts can be seen as one of these.
Might CRTs and community-based credit unions supported
by advice and support agencies find ways of partnering
more closely together in a way that builds on their relative
organisational advantages? This is the key question. 
The goal of the CBP model is to achieve the joining-up
necessary to tackle financial exclusion in robust ways that
can be replicated and scaled up nationally. CBP is a
practical response to the Government’s call for
“partnership both with the financial services sector and
with voluntary and community bodies to help where
financial exclusion still persists, especially in relation to
paying bills, accessing affordable credit and obtaining free
debt advice.” (H.M. Treasury 2004:114-5). It is also a view
shared by Debt on Our Doorstep (Rossiter & Cooper 2005),
a coalition of 150 organisations committed to campaigning
to end financial exclusion. 
In line with one of the lessons from the UK experience –
that service provision must reflect local circumstances – our
proposed Community Banking Partnership is not a rigid
model. This five point approach is based on a ‘customer
first’ philosophy:
1 Access through a service-level agreement(s) to
appropriate advice and support, involving financial
literacy and help with household budgets and paying
bills. 
2 Accessible and affordable credit provision, based on the
assumptions that the competition is doorstep lenders,
and that the sustainability of the lender is of
paramount importance.
3 Access to mainstream banking services, with basic
banking accounts being the start not the end of
financial inclusion.
4 Accepting that access to a savings vehicle is central to
any long-term solution to financial exclusion.
5 Efficient and effective delivery through the provision of
integrated access points for the services of both lenders
and advice agencies. 
To achieve these aims it is first necessary for partners and
contracted service providers to accept that:
a) An understanding of who the client groups are and
that their needs are central to any success.
b) Participants need to be willing to consult, mediate, and
negotiate.
c) Partners and service providers need to be willing to
accept their own limitations, and place working to
achieve financial inclusion over and above narrow
sectoral interests. 
d) That doorstep lenders provide a service that many
people find useful, but that the cost of this service
detrimentally effects the local economy.
e) Resources will be required for advice support and also
long-term technical assistance that cannot be offset by
income from interest rates alone.
f) Credit unions and CDFIs are financial institutions, not
social services. Therefore, they need to adopt a
business model that is operationally sustainable and not
unduly dependent upon long-term grant funding.
g) There is a need for benchmarks, common reporting
standards, and public disclosure of information. 
What could a Community
Banking Partnership look like?
The original promotional literature published in late 2004
suggested that a Community Banking Partnership would
be a single organisation combining a community
reinvestment trust, a credit union, and a charity. Though
this could happen, following extensive discussions with
practitioners, our thinking has since evolved. Instead we
recommend a more á la carte approach with a strong
emphasis on performance and execution through effective
delivery arrangements. We envisage that each Community
Banking Partnership would be unique to its locality to
reflect the nature of the existing suppliers and
relationships. Thus there are four levels of engagement in a
CBP. 
Community Banking Partnership: 
A Joined-up Solution for
Financial Inclusion 
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Group structure approach
This is where there is a very close working relationship
between a CDFI and a credit union within a group
organisational structure (or as near as financial regulation
allows), with a single chief officer. These organisations
could be based in the same office and clients would
receive a seamless service. In addition, the organisation
could be connected to a charity that may act as a conduit
to raise funding to deliver money and debt advice.
However, the group structure approach is unlikely to
happen in most areas and can be seen as an ultimate
objective. 
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What they would get
from a referral
approach. Refer to
others and can
describe what other
services are available.
What they would get
from a working
protocol approach.
Single telephone
number, access to
diaries to make
appointments.
What they would get
from a service level
agreement approach
e.g. single office.
Seamless BCD, 
close to A.
What they would get
from a group
structure approach.
Seamless ABCD.
Community Banking Partnership
 
Contractual service level agreement
approach
Partners remain sovereign but work in tandem to an
agreed strategy for the whole community backed-up by
service level agreements. Customers would expect to
access services through an integrated process, many of the
staff could work for one or more partners, and a joint
charity may be established to finance the support and
advice activity. What would not happen is a full merger or
transferring assets between the parties. 
Working protocol approach
This approach seeks to identify and develop some
economies of scale and improve the customer experience.
For example, the service providers may have a single
telephone connection and partners would have access to
each other’s diaries to enable appointments for clients to
be made. What a working protocol would not include is
any reference to the merger of back office provision and/or
enhancing staff understanding by working in the same
location. 
Referral approach 
In areas where existing relationships are not particularly
effective and considerable time needs to be spent on
building trust, then a memorandum of understanding
between sovereign organisations may be the most
appropriate solution. In this structure, credit unions, advice
agencies, and a CDFI are fully aware of each other’s
activities and make extensive referrals but they have little
engagement in seeking economies of scale and improving
the customer experience.
All these levels of engagement present alternative types of
community banking partnerships, but the most important
thing is that they offer an evolutionary way to deliver an
enhanced customer experience and fulfil the Government’s
ambition of a fully inclusive society. The starting points in
different communities will vary; in some all the required
components of supply will be in place whereas in others
there may be a relatively blank canvas. The most important
feature is the nature of the contracts between the parties
and specifically the adopted performance targets. For if the
community banking partnerships are to grow and deepen
it is necessary from the outset that all parties understand
what each other are to deliver. Therefore, if a full merger is
not the preferred option, the CBP will need to have
contractual obligations with stringent performance levels
that need to be achieved. In this respect, it is taking
lessons from the way private sector manufacturers
effectively control contracted-out component
manufacturing. Trust may be central to the personal
relationships, but each party has clear legal obligations to
each other that must be fulfilled. There is no reason why a
similar system could not operate when addressing financial
inclusion, particularly as each component of the overall
strategy is the responsibility of different agencies and
organisations.
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The CBP model has developed out of work by nef, the
National Association of Credit Union Workers (NACUW)
and Community Finance Solutions at the University of
Salford. The approach combines the best practices of
community-based credit unions and community
reinvestment trusts in Britain. It also draws upon service
delivery lessons from Community Development Credit
Union (CDCU) practices in the USA and Money Advice and
Budgeting Services (MABS) projects in Ireland. The first
prototype model is now fully funded and will go live in
Birmingham in summer 2005. 
Four charitable trusts and the Welsh Assembly have
provided funding to undertake feasibility studies and
business plans for CBP pathfinders. These studies have
been completed for a second CBP in rural Mid-Wales, and
a third CBP in Portsmouth and Southampton. Furthermore,
feasibilities studies are underway in Devon, East London,
Coventry, North East England, and Merseyside. Overall by
summer 2006, a national pilot demonstration project
should be underway involving initially up to eight CBP
pathfinders, with a growing level of investment support
from charitable foundations, banks and government
bodies. 
In addition, to the work in Birmingham and the seven
feasibility studies there are other areas developing
groundbreaking initiatives along similar lines, including
Sheffield, Blackpool, and Sandwell in the West Midlands.
We applaud this and believe it indicates that some form of
community banking partnership is the most appropriate
and practical solution for those primarily interested in
addressing financial exclusion. 
The goal the National CBP Demonstration Project sets itself
is to show demonstrably how to tackle financial exclusion
and provide affordable financial services to low-income
households in a sustainable manner. 
The six main objectives are to: 
a) Develop robust but flexible prototypes – the
Community Banking Partnership approach – that is able
to provide financial services to an increasing number of
low-income households.
b) Develop a set of common core services including
savings, affordable credit, household insurance, bill and
debt repayment alongside money advice and financial
literacy services.
c) Develop a prototype whose core services provide a
strong infrastructure upon which can be added other
financial services.
d) Build strong local community banking partnerships to
assist in marketing the financial inclusion services and
with the hands on involvement of local authorities,
CABx, independent advice agencies, banks, housing
associations, utility companies and other essential
service providers.
e) Support the progressive transition of the Community
Banking Partnership pathfinders to sustainable sources
of financing and long-term, operational sustainability. 
f) Build upon the best practices that evolve both from the
CBP Pathfinders and other similar innovators in this
field, to develop a national strategy that attracts
additional government and private sector support for
community banking partnership ventures across Britain. 
What is happening now with regards to
promoting community banking
partnerships? 
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Areas of Investment: Sustainability
and Social Return – Key Goals
The National Demonstration Project will have three main
areas of activity over a three-year period:
(i) Community Banking Partnership resource
mobilisation strategy – Investment will be sought
from local, regional and national resources to support
the pathfinder organisations. Within these areas,
existing bodies will be assisted in the development of
community banking partnerships in their region.  
(ii) Capacity building, technical support and product
development – This covers the costs of pre-
development and capacity-building work, business
planning, technical support, training, product
development and management.  Experience from the
USA has demonstrated that organisational
development and technical support are as important as
investment funding itself. This will help advice and
support agencies, credit unions and CDFIs to
strengthen their organisational capacity to provide
services on a larger scale and to achieve operational
sustainability.
(iii) Monitoring and evaluation – Measuring the
economic performance and social impact of the
pathfinders will be crucial to understanding whether
and how the CBP is cost effectively contributing to
alleviating financial exclusion.  Results of such
performance evaluation and impact analysis will be fed
back to the participants and the funders during
implementation. In addition, being partnerships the
influence of human interactions is likely to be a key
variable in the relative success of the projects.  Thus it
is planned to develop an experiential learning approach
appraisal, which will inform project design,
implementation, and delivery strategies, drawing on
process and output findings. The overall policy results
will also be fed back to policy-makers. 
In relation to tackling financial exclusion, a key measure
will be the ability of pathfinders to make inroads into the
estimated six per cent of the local market of low-income
households currently using high-cost doorstep lenders
(Brown et al 2003).  If a proportion of these could be
persuaded to use a urbanised CBP pathfinder we estimate
that if a credit union is one of the partners, the pathfinder
would see an increase of credit union membership to at
least 2,500 over five years (including 1,000 directly from
doorstep lenders)10.  Assuming an average charge of 177
per cent APR, the savings in interest costs by helping 1,000
low-income households move from moneylenders to
affordable credit union loan rates would amount to about
£700,000 in wealth retained in each of the six pathfinder
areas.  
It is our view that if implemented, the CBP
will lead to stronger community-based
credit union and community reinvestment
trust growth in England and Wales. This will
increase access to affordable financial
services by poorer households and provide a
robust methodology for minimising the
social injustices linked with financial
exclusion.  Conservative projections show an
aggregate direct and measurable financial
benefit to low-income households within
five years of almost £700,000 in each
Community Banking Partnership area. This
additional income will not only directly
increase disposable income of Britain’s
poorest households; it also means that there
is more cash to spend in local shops and
businesses. Tackling financial exclusion in
this way is socially desirable, but equally it’s
good for the British economy.  
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10 This may be less in rural areas where a lower total population may be
served by a CBP and thus proportionately less will use doorstep lenders.
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